在角逐殘酷的美國商界，首席實行官們極少讓人視為可以訴苦的對象，或者是職業進步方面可信任的顧問。

In America's dog-eat-dog business world, chief executives are rarely seen as friendly shoulders to cry on or trusted advisers^{1 on career development.
然而，代表投資者對公司進行批判性剖析的華爾街剖析師，卻把其研究對象企業的首席實行官視為如此的人。}

But that is exactly how Wall Street analysts^{3 - whose job is to cast a critical eye on companies on behalf of investors4 - appeared to have regarded the executives of companies they covered.
近日公布的一份學術研究報告顯示，數百名股票剖析師曾向企業首席實行官們尋求幫助，涉及內容包羅萬象，從怎么樣與該銀行的顧客見面，到他們的個人問題。}

According to an academic study to be released today, hundreds of equity^{5 analysts asked executives for favours ranging from meetings with their banks' clients to advice on personal matters.
多數首席實行官會答應這類請求，但這種慷慨的價碼非常高：假如公司營業額遜色，或進行了一宗風險較高的并購買賣，同意幫忙的剖析師將不太可能調降該企業的評級。}

Most executives obliged but their generosity^{6 came at a price: analysts on the receiving end of executives' favours were less likely to downgrade a company as a result of poor earnings7 or a risky8 acquisition.
相應的，假如了解另一位剖析師由于發布了對該公司不利的研究報告，因而在尋求幫助時遭到該公司拒絕，那樣，其他剖析師們采取類似行為的可能性也大大減少。}

Similarly, knowing that another analyst^{2 had been denied favours as a result of negative coverage9 made analysts much less likely to take similar action.
這一史無前例的研究顯示，近年來一直縈繞在華爾街和美國企業界關系上的利益沖突問題依舊存在，且相當緊急。該研究報告的作者為密歇根大學的詹姆斯o韋斯特法爾和得克薩斯大學的邁克爾o克萊門特。}

The unprecedented^{11 research - by James Westphal of the University of Michigan and Michael Clement of the University of Texas - suggests that the conflicts of interests that have plagued the interaction between Wall Street and corporate12 America in recent years are alive and well.
韋斯特法爾表示：這是首席實行官和剖析師之間關系的不良反應，這種關系或許會削弱剖析師建議的客觀性。假如剖析師確實遭到了首席實行官幫忙的影響，那樣投資者，特別是散戶投資者，如何能信任剖析師的研究報告呢？}

This is a side-effect of the relationship between executives and analysts that can perhaps compromise the objectivity of their recommendations, says Mr Westphal. But if analysts are indeed swayed by chief executives' largesse^{13, how could investors, especially retail14 investors, trust their calls?
華爾街剖析師的獨立性曾多次遭到質疑。然而，直到目前，監管機構的重點一直放在將投行內部的業務員和薦股剖析師脫離關系上。自從安然丑聞爆發后，美國已經進行了有關改革，兩者的關系已不那樣密切了。}

The independence of Wall Street analysts has been repeatedly questioned. Until now, however, the regulatory spotlight^{15 had focused on unwinding the relationship between dealmakers and stockpickers within investment banks, which has become much less cosplayy16 since post-Enron reforms.
至于剖析師和企業首席實行官之間的關系，多數察看人士覺得，主要問題在2000年就已解決了。當時，美國監管者將企業向某些剖析師透露股價敏銳信息列為非法行為。}

As for the links between analysts and executives, most observers believed the main problem had been resolved in 2000, when US regulators outlawed^{17 the disclosure of price-sensitive information to selected analysts.
然而，這一最新研究卻采取了獨一無二的方法。調查于2001年至2003年進行，針對1800多名剖析師進行了問卷調查，他們的回答得到了數百名首席實行官的驗證。}

But the new study - carried out between 2001 and 2003 on more than 1,800 analysts whose responses were cross-checked with those of hundreds of executives - takes a different approach.
調查的出發點是兩個心理學公理：第一，個人會對那些向他們提供幫助的人心存感激。第二，假如人覺得自己能從幫助中得到某些東西，他們更大概向別人提供幫助。

Its starting point is two psychological axioms: that inpiduals feel grateful to those doing them a favour; and that human beings are more likely to bestow^{18 a favour on someone when they think there is something in it for them.
然而，調查結果甚至令報告的作者感到意料之外。他們表示，他們就爭議性較小的事情提出長長的問題，再把這個問題隱藏在其中，如此，剖析師就會承認曾同意過幫助。}

The findings, however, surprised even the authors of the report, who say they were able to get analysts to admit to receiving favours by burying the questions within a long questionnaire on less controversial, issues.
研究者發現，公司未能達成營業額預期的次數越多，首席實行官們向剖析師提供幫忙的可能性也就越大，特別是對于那些頂級的剖析師。

The researchers found that the more a company missed its earnings forecast, the more chief executives were likely to offer favours to analysts, particularly the highly rated ones.
可能更為讓人意料之外的是，這一方案好像非常有用。

Perhaps more surprisingly, the tactic^{19 appeared to work.
假如一家公司在其核心市場以外進行高風險并購，同意幫忙的剖析師對該公司降級的可能性降低了65%。}

In the case of a risky acquisition that moved the company away from its core markets, the likelihood of a downgrade by a favoured analyst was cut by 65 per cent.
華爾街察看人士表示，同意研究對象的幫忙，違反了行業組織CFA協會的行為準則。

Wall Street observers said that accepting favours from companies under coverage is a breach^{20 of the code of conduct of the CFA Institute, the trade body.
然而，前電信業高級剖析師、《一位華爾街剖析師的自白》作者丹o萊因戈爾德表示，盡管這類調查結果讓人意料之外，但它提醒大家，研究剖析中存在利益沖突。}

But Dan Reingold, a former TOP telecoms analyst and author of Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, said that, although the findings were surprising, they served as a reminder^{22 that there remained conflicts of interest in research.
他表示，主要的利益沖突包含接近公司管理層與獲得公司信息，但他補充稱，這對于機構投資者的重要程度要小于散戶投資者。}

He said the key conflicts involved access to company management and information flow, but added that they were less important for institutional investors than for retail investors.
機構投資者一般都了解某一位剖析師是不是與某家企業的管理層關系很密切，因此，它們會有意無意地質疑剖析師的推薦。它們會擠掉剖析師建議中的水分。但閱讀這份研究報告的散戶投資者對里面的這類關系毫不知情。

Institutional investors will often know if a particular analyst is very close to certain managements and therefore might either consciously or unconsciously tilt^{23 their recommendations. They can discount the recommendations. The retail client who reads the research has no idea about any of these relationships.
德意志銀行銀行業剖析師邁克o梅奧非常早之前就表示，剖析師面臨的來自研究對象的重壓，與來自投資銀行同事的重壓一樣大。}

Mike Mayo, banking^{24 analyst at Deutsche Bank, has long argued that the pressure analysts come under from the companies they cover is as significant as the pressure from their investment banking colleagues.
2002年安然丑聞爆發后，梅奧在向美國參議院銀行委員會作證表示，公司及其管理層是最好的信息來源，看好這個公司并存在利益沖突的剖析師可能最知道這類信息。}

In testimony^{25 to the Senate banking committee following the Enron scandal in 2002, Mr Mayo said that companies and their managements were the best source of information and bullish and conflicted analysts may have the best access to this information.}